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Do commercial banks invest less in information gathering activity when they compete more aggressively with each other? There is now considerable interest in whether intensifying competitive pressure in bank loan markets will affect the quality of informational ties that bind borrowers and lending banks 1 . The idea of the transmission of project-specific private information from a borrowing firm to a lending bank goes back at least to Fama's (1985) conjecture that banks provide inside financing as opposed to what was subsequently called arm's-length financing provided by capital markets. This notion could be seen as a major building block of the modern theory of the commercial bank 2 and empirical research has provided numerous pieces of evidence in favour of it. Although this view is now widely accepted in general, what determines the intensity of a bank's information acquisition is still poorly understood. We do not yet know much about whether some banks acquire more information and systematically build stronger ties to their customers than others 3 . What determines banks' information gathering activity cross-sectionally, or through time?
Furthermore, are there other related functions that banks perform -for example that of providing liquidity services to their loan customers -that are affected by banks' information acquisition activity?
In this paper we analyse whether local bank market structure -proxying for bank market power -affects banks' information acquisition activity. To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical study that directly addresses information transmission within bankcustomer relationships. Using survey data from small and medium-sized German manufacturing firms, we are able to directly measure information flows from firms to banks within a loan application situation. We find that local bank market concentration has a positive and significant impact on banks' information gathering activity. Similarly to Petersen/Rajan (1995), we take standard measures of the concentration of a local market as an approximation for bank market power. 4 In a second step the data set allows us to consider 4 what could be termed a natural experiment on the hypothesised market structure/information relationship: For example: if it is true that banks in more concentrated markets systematically acquire more information in the normal course of a business relationship, these banks should be able to provide liquidity at short notice without inducing additional costly transfer of information and vice versa. As a consequence of this, the aforementioned relationship between market structure and information transmission should be reversed for a subsample of firms that have experienced a liquidity shock and, as a consequence, demand short-term liquidity. Our results indicate that in such a situation informational requirements are significantly lower for firms located in more concentrated banking markets as well as for firms that already have a long-term relationship with the bank they approach.
In the last step of our analysis we assess whether the informational intensity within lending relationships addressed in the first part of the study has consequences in terms of firms' financing patterns. Here we use information on the degree of discounts for early payment which are taken by each firm as an approximation of credit availability. This last step is thus a reappraisal of Petersen/Rajan's (1995) study, using German data. The results are similar to the US findings although the first two steps of the study offer an explanation for a relationship between credit availability and bank market power that differs from Petersen/Rajan's as it is more directly related to information acquisition activity. The paper proceeds as follows: In section I we briefly review the relevant theoretical literature and derive testable hypotheses. Section II outlines the design of the study and presents our results.
Section III sums up and concludes.
I Bank Market Power and Information Acquisition in Loan Markets
There is now intense academic interest in the welfare implications of increasing competitive pressure in bank loan markets. Standard economic thought predicts positive welfare effects that arise primarily from lower loan rates and larger loan volume. 5 In banking markets, however, this might not be the whole story as several bank products are characterised by asymmetry of information between banks and their customers as well as implicit risk sharing arrangements within multi-period contractual relationships. This seems to be especially important for bank loan products such as lines of credit, loan commitments or longer-term bank loans negotiated in spot markets. It is now widely accepted that long-term relationships between banks and loan customers observable in real-world loan markets provide a framework within which the solution of information problems is more efficiently accomplished. It is also widely believed that bank uniqueness rests mainly on a bank's ability to acquire and evaluate borrower-specific private information. However, exactly how the transmission of information within lending relationships takes place has remained largely unexplored. For example, is learning-by-lending all that is needed to provide banks with superior information? A learning-by-lending technology is assumed in most of the theory of relationship lending. 6 This notion is also implicit in most empirical studies that try to measure informational intensities by using the duration of the bank-borrower relationship as a proxy. 7 In contrast to this strand of the literature, in what follows we assume that information does not only accumulate over time but information acquisition is a costly activity and a choice variable of the bank. Thus the information problem becomes endogenous in the bank's incentives to invest in borrower-specific information, which might -among other things -be influenced by competitive pressure in bank loan markets.
This raises the question of whether taking account of these characteristic features of bank loans in models of bank competition leads to results that go beyond the standard industrial economics result. The theoretical literature offers at least three explanations of why bank market power might affect banks' information gathering activity. We review them briefly here.
Mayer (1988) claimed that competitive financial markets might be detrimental to economic welfare in that they make long-term relationships between financiers and entrepreneurs harder to sustain. This notion was formalised in Petersen/Rajan (1995) who also provided empirical evidence indicating that small and medium-sized US firms based in more concentrated banking markets (i) take early payment discounts more often, (ii) show a stronger reliance on debt financing by financial institutions and (iii) pay lower loan rates when young, and higher loan rates when old compared to similar firms based in more competitive markets. In the theoretical part of their paper, Petersen/Rajan focus on a bank's ability to share in the future borrower project surplus whenever it exercises market power over the borrowing firm.
In their theoretical two-period model the bank becomes fully informed after the first period because of a simple and costless learning-by-lending technology. In what follows we will argue that costly information acquisition provides another mechanism that makes bank market power a meaningful determinant of credit availability, although we do not address the pricing dimension in our empirical study. From our perspective, assuming that information acquisition activity eats up part of a bank's resources is crucial but does not seem to be unrealistic. Casual empiricism tells us instead that commercial banks devote considerable resources to acquiring and processing borrower specific information. Obviously loan availability as well as loan pricing should be affected by the accuracy and timeliness of the information a lending bank has about a borrower's prospects and credit risk.
One reason why increasing bank competition might be detrimental to a lender's incentives to undertake costly screening/monitoring is that once a lender has granted a loan to a firm, other potential lenders might be able to observe this at low cost. Given that the bank has borne a non-trivial cost in screening the applicant, competitor banks can offer better terms of lending as they free ride on the first bank's screening effort. Thus, as a consequence of free riding behaviour, underprovision of screening prevails in equilibrium in competitive credit markets. 8 Whether information spillover, competitor banks' free riding, and switching behaviour on the part of borrowing firms are empirically important, and whether they are related to market structure in banking markets, are questions that remain to be analysed. There are, however, several pieces of evidence that would seem to point in this direction. Petersen/Rajan (1995) find that firms located in the most competitive banking markets are solicited significantly more often by competitor banks than firms in the least competitive markets. The difference seems to be especially pronounced for older firms where their mere survival as well as a sequence of credit granting decisions by banks in the past has already disclosed signals of project quality to competitor banks. Evidence of another type comes from so-called bank uniqueness studies: It is now widely believed that announcements of bank loan agreements systematically lead to re-evaluations of the borrowers by capital market participants. 9 What is often overlooked in interpreting these findings is that measured capital market reactions are evidence of information spillover effects that take place in financial markets 10 .
A second fundamental hypothesis about the relationship between bank market power and bank monitoring effort takes entrepreneurial incentive problems more directly into account. In monitoring an entrepreneur acting under limited liability who -for well known reasons -is willing to shift to inefficient investment projects, a bank normally cannot commit to a certain level of monitoring. As banks' monitoring effort serves to deter entrepreneurs from choosing an inefficient project, whenever a bank exercises market power it is able to extract part of the incremental surplus created by monitoring (through more efficient investment decisions). Market power thus acts like an implicit equity stake and serves to reduce the bank's own moral hazard problem -that of underproviding costly monitoring effort ex post. From this perspective a monopolist bank has first-best monitoring incentives as it is able to appropriate the full project surplus. This idea is formalised in Caminal/Matutes (2000). There is a trade-off to be taken into account in that increasing bank market power leads to increasing bank monitoring and thus more efficient allocation of credit and higher credit availability. On the other hand, bank market power increases loan rates and makes the incentive problems more severe, forcing the bank to ration credit in order to deal with borrower moral hazard. As a result of these countervailing forces, the effect of bank market power on social welfare crucially depends on the severity of the informational asymmetry between banks and borrowers. However, bank market power is expected to increase monitoring incentives when information acquisition is costly and the bank cannot commit to a certain level of monitoring.
11
The literature considered so far predicts that there is a positive correlation between bank market power and banks' costly information acquisition activity. What makes our empirical contribution interesting is that other papers contradict this widely held view in that they predict increasing informational intensity when banking markets become more After discussing the theoretical work that forms the basis for our empirical study, several remarks are in order here: Firstly, our study is interested in bank behaviour given bank market power -of which we believe information acquisition is a central aspect. Thus, this paper regards bank market power as being exogenous. The question of how the qualitative aspects of bank-borrower relationships that we address here feed back into banking market structures obviously goes beyond the scope of our study. 13 We will come back to this point in section 3.7 below.
Secondly, the equilibrium bank behaviour in which this paper is interested should not be confused with more explicit forms of bank-borrower relationships. It seems important to make this point clear: The influence that bank market power might have on banks' information acquisition does not preclude the possibility that some firms might voluntarily offer banks a type of information monopoly precisely in order to overcome perceived credit availability problems. 14 Given our theoretical discussion above, one external determinant of these problems (i.e. one that lies outside a firm's own characteristics) could be bank market power or a lack thereof. 15 Thus, whenever firms can feasibly commit to a long-term relationship with a bank to overcome credit availability problems caused by bank market power, our tests would be biased against finding any effect of bank market power on information gathering, whatever the direction of that relationship might be. 16 Given the theoretical literature surveyed above, another point deserves to be mentioned: In Boot/Thakor (2000) a distinction is made between competition from banks and competition from the capital markets, e.g. from investment banks acting as underwriters in the corporate bond or commercial paper markets. For the design of our study we can safely say that, for the sample of small and medium-sized German firms in our analysis, capital market sources of finance during the sample period were hardly a viable alternative to bank loans. In
Germany, for example, only large firms had access to the commercial paper market or the market for longer-term bonds and the German market for corporate bonds was thin by any measure. Descriptive statistics from our sample firms confirm this prior as more than 85% of all firms that wanted to raise debt financing turned to banks to apply for a loan 17 . As the empirical study relies on the cross-sectional variability of local bank market structures in
Germany it is primarily aimed at measuring the effects of interbank competition on banks'
incentives to invest in relationship-specific information and thus to form strong ties to their borrowers.
II
The empirical study A Design of the study Using survey data from small and medium-sized manufacturing firms, this study is in a unique position to directly measure information flows from firms to banks within a loan application situation. The study derives two measures to capture the amount and structure of the information transmitted. We then endeavour to explain this flow of information within a regression framework and control for firm characteristics, loan variables and standard relationship variables. We are primarily interested in the relationship between local bank market structure on the one hand and the information flow on the other. The German banking market seems to be an excellent terrain for investigating the relationship between information acquisition and bank market structure. Firstly, the German financial system is often referred to as a classical example of a so called bank-based system, where universal banks play a dominant role in nearly every segment of the financial market and have built strong ties to the corporate sector. Secondly, the German banking system, like other continental European banking markets, was often said to be characterised by collusive behaviour and regulatory capture, but is now expected to become more competitive as the deregulation and integration of European financial markets progresses. 18 Thirdly, the German banking system is regionally segmented into many small local markets and thus offers a wide variety of local market structures which seem to be the relevant market at least for the medium and small sized segment of the corporate loan market. This latter point is widely recognised as being applicable to the US banking market, as indicated by the use of local market structure variables in empirical banking studies. 19 It is however neglected in most empirical studies of European banking markets.
The first step of our analysis, as described above, is to seek to ascertain the determinants of banks' information acquisition within the normal course of a business relationship. As a second step, the data set allows us to consider what could be termed a natural experiment on the hypothesised market structure/information relationship. For example, if it is true that banks in more concentrated markets systematically acquire more information in the normal course of a business relationship, these banks should be able to provide liquidity at short notice without inducing additional costly transfer of information and vice versa. As a consequence, the aforementioned correlation between market structure and information transmission should be reversed in sign for a subsample of firms that have experienced a liquidity shock and as a consequence demand short-term liquidity. This effect might be especially important because information transmission from a borrowing firm to a lending bank within a distress situation might be seriously prone to cheating behaviour on the part of the firm. Information collected in the past might thus prove to be an extremely helpful and reliable input into the bank's decision making when confronted with a borrowing firm's short-term liquidity needs. Whenever a borrowing firm demands liquidity at short notice, the bank needs to distinguish between at least two likely explanations for the firm's current financial position. On the one hand, the firm might have experienced a drain of liquidity that has relatively little effect on its prospects and thus its ability to make interest and principal payments in the future. On the other hand, the liquidity shortage that the firm is currently experiencing might simply be an indication that the firm is low quality and doomed to fail anyway. The bank's position here is that of being exposed to the risk of throwing good money after bad. Obviously a bank that has acquired more borrower-specific information in the past should be better able to see through the veil of the firm's current financial position and assess its prospects more accurately. As a consequence, less additional information is needed in a situation where information transmission is especially costly and extremely prone to cheating behaviour on the part of the firm. Furthermore the timeliness of a bank's decision might be crucial in such a scenario and the aspect of the costs to be borne by the firm should not be neglected, especially if it is a small one and managerial capabilities are a scarce resource.
Note here that the design of the empirical study critically hinges on the distinction between, on the one hand, information transmission during normal lending business and on the other, informational requirements that allow banks to provide liquidity services to their loan customers under exceptional circumstances in which qualitative aspects of the bankborrower relationship that have been built up in the past come to bear. Note further that recent assessments of the functions that commercial banks perform emphasise their funding of opaque, complex positions based on acquiring borrower-specific information on the one hand and the provision of liquidity services to their customer on the other. 20 Obviously these two functions are deeply interrelated in that it is the information acquired that make banks a unique low-cost source of liquidity.
In the third step of our empirical analysis we assess whether the informational intensity within lending relationships addressed in the first part of the analysis has consequences in terms of firms' financing patterns. We therefore use information on the degree to which firms take advantage of early payment discounts as an approximation of the availability of credit. This last step is a reappraisal of Petersen/Rajan's (1995) study, using
German data, insofar as we too measure the impact of bank market structure as a determinant of credit availability. The results that we obtain in this third step of our analysis are similar to the US findings, but the first two steps of the study offer an explanation for a relationship between credit availability and bank market power that directly focuses on banks' information acqusition.
B
The data set
The data set used in this study is from the IfO Institute for Economic Research in Munich, a leading economic research institution in Germany. In addition to its regular Investment Survey, IfO conducted a Survey on Corporate Finance in 1997. A questionnaire was sent to 4,833 manufacturing and construction firms spread all over Germany. As the aim of the questionnaire was to assess the circumstances and motives of firms' external financing decisions, the first part of the survey dealt with equity financing whereas the second part asked for the firm's last attempt to raise debt financing. Note that the sample was limited to firms in the manufacturing or construction sectors only, and is thus quite homogenous. We are primarily interested in those firms that approached a bank to apply for a bank loan.
Among the 1,531 units that remained after elimination of all firms with incomplete data, we identified 403 that applied for a bank loan in 1996.
C. Information flow variables
Among other things, firms were asked for a list of information items that they had to submit to the lending bank. Several items -among them cash flow projections, short term financial statements, feasibility studies or long-term strategies -were offered as a prespecified category. Firms could also indicate other items, if any additional information was transmitted. The firms' answers to this question serve as a basis for our measure of information flow to the bank. Our first variable, called INFOCOUNT, is designed simply to count the information items reported. The assumption here is that a bank's information acquisition is a latent unobservable variable and mapped onto an ordinal scale represented by
INFOCOUNT. Obviously this measure is not without its problems. For example, the actual informational content of the items considered here might overlap.
Our second measure therefore tries to capture the qualitative aspects as well as the cost aspects that form the basis of the theoretical underpinnings of the empirical study. Here we draw a distinction between what we refer to as "hard" information and "soft" information items. Roughly speaking, hard information is defined as information that comes in numbers, that could be processed automatically, benchmarked against industry averages or comparable firms. Furthermore this type of information could generally be fed into analytical models, like discriminant analysis, that are widely used by German banks. In contrast, soft information could in general not even be reported in standardised fashion as it requires a firm's managers to report on their products, customers, investment projects and strategies.
We believe that this distinction is directly related to the cost aspects that drive the theoretical models discussed above, in which information acquisition was modelled as a sunk cost investment in bank-customer relationships. The assumption here is that soft information is more costly to evaluate. We therefore define a second alternative information flow variable that -as an ordered category -takes the value of 1 when only hard information items are transmitted and the value of 2 whenever, in addition, soft information items are transmitted.
Interestingly, in only 17% of all cases does a bank acquire only soft information, without acquiring hard items at the same time. This observation might be an indication that the ordering we have in mind is indeed real. For those observations where only soft information items are transmitted one could assign INFOSTRUCTURE a value of either 1 or of 2. The results reported below were achieved when we assigned a value of 1, but using the alternative method does not change any of our results. We take as a base group those firms which transmitted balance sheet information only. This is a statutory requirement for all loans larger than DM 100,000 and is also stipulated in nearly every bank's internal credit standards, irrespective of loan volume, so that it does not provide us with any incremental information.
For this base group the variable INFOSTRUCTURE takes a value of 0. We believe that INFOSTRUCTURE enables us to capture qualitative differences in rating styles among banks as well as the cost implications of those styles, which are of theoretical interest.
D. Descriptive statistics
In table 1 we present descriptive statistics for three subsamples that were differentiated according to the type of loan the firm applied for. 212 firms applied for a medium-to longterm bank loan, 58 firms renegotiated their lines of credit and 133 firms applied for a loan under a public sector loan programme, the most prominent of which is the ERP programme, a successor to the former Marshall Aid Fund. It is important to note here that a line of credit in
Germany takes the form of a transaction account with an overdraft facility. A line of credit thus is a classical bank product that provvides a loan customer with liquidity services 21 .
[ 23 . We have already drawn attention to the importance of this assumption for the design of our study (see above). Banks are assumed to perform a distinct function in these cases as they provide liquidity services to their loan customers.
Another important result emerges from table 1. In our regression analysis below we disregard those firms that applied for a bank loan provided under a public sector loan programme (results for that group are displayed in the fourth column of table 1). In these public sector programmes, banks merely pass on loans originated by a state-owned bank such as KfW, 24 a federally owned bank that originates loans under the so called ERP programme. 25 In some of these cases the bank approached by the borrower does not even bear the full credit risk inherent in the loan. Furthermore, and even more importantly for our purposes here, one has to take into account that the informational requirements of loan applications in such a programme are determined outside the bank-borrower relationship, e.g. in the loan programme's guidelines. 26 As a consequence of these two fundamental weaknesses, we exclude these 133 firms from our sample. Our next step is to assess whether firms located in more concentrated banking markets are different from firms in highly competitive bank market areas. As bank market concentration serves as a key variable in our study, this is an extremely important question to ask. Table 2 therefore provides descriptive statistics and allows us to analyse whether marked differences exist between firms from the more concentrated markets and their counterparts located in more competitive markets. In addition to a sample split by market concentration we found it important to look for differences between firms located in eastern and western
Germany. Besides likely differences in age, size, industry and financial position this distinction is also recommended for our purposes, because banking markets in eastern Germany are significantly more concentrated than local banking markets in western Germany.
Note that to obtain the results displayed in table 2, all observations with public sector loans had already been eliminated; they will not be considered in what follows.
The general structural difference in terms of market concentration is mirrored in our sample (the mean value of the Herfindahl is 0.169 for western Germany and 0.279 for eastern Germany). Thus in order not to bias the interpretation of the descriptive statistics in table 2 we decided to split the sample into eastern and western German subsamples. 27 In most cases, there are statistically significant differences between the eastern and western German subsamples in terms of the firms' characteristics given in table 2 (except for equity ratios).
Within these subsamples, however, the differences between firms located in high concentration banking markets and those in low concentration banking markets are never statistically significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless an interesting result applies to those variables that are often interpreted as indicators of firms facing liquidity constraints.
Nearly twice as many firms in low concentration markets reported that they "never" or "infrequently" take early payment discounts offered by their suppliers. Remember that Petersen/Rajan (1994, 1995) used early payment discounts taken by their sample firms as an indicator of credit availability. Given our small sample sizes, the difference based on high and low concentration subsamples turns out not to be significant at conventional levels for western German firms (p-value 0.124) and a similar conclusion can be drawn for eastern
German firms. With respect to early payment discounts it is important to note that our sample is composed entirely of firms from the manufacturing and construction sector and all sample firms are regularly offered early payment discounts by their suppliers. 28 Moreover, the use of credit lines follows a similar pattern to the use of early payment discounts: Here 28.9% of the firms located in the more competitive markets subsample reported that on average over the year lines of credit are drawn by more than 75%, whereas only 19.5% reported comparable use of their lines of credit in the more concentrated markets (p-value 0.1488). For both variables, the figures for eastern Germany show the same pattern (fewer firms are liquidity-constrained in the high concentration subsample), although again the differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. We will, however, return to these differences in the third step of our empirical study, where we do not restrict the analysis to those firms that applied for bank loans in 1996 but use the full sample of firms within a multivariate framework. For the moment we are interested in the determinants of bank information acquisition activity, which we are attempting to measure by INFOCOUNT and INFOSTRUCTURE. As indicated by the last two rows of table 2, there seem to be marked differences between eastern and western Germany in terms of information acquisition by banks. Again, differences based on market structure split within these subsamples seem to be of no statistical significance although they are always higher in the high concentration subsamples.
[table 2 around here]
Like Petersen/Rajan (1995) we also checked for the industry composition of our sample. This might be important because industry is a good proxy for business risk and tangibility of assets, aspects that are likely to influence a bank's perception of credit risk. Figures 1 and 2 show the western German and eastern German subsamples according to the firms' industry classification. Here again we do not find marked differences between firms in low concentration and firms in high concentration markets.
[figures 1 and 2 around here]

E. Regression results
We now study the determinants of the flow of information within a regression framework. regressions is motivated by the fact that most banks' internal credit standards require more information acquisition with larger loan volumes. 29 As these internal credit standards are rigid over time and not adjusted on a customer by customer basis, it seems appropriate to control for this effect.
A firm's financial position seems to impact bank information gathering activity in the sense that firms that are in a poor financial position have to disclose more information to their potential lenders. The coefficient for the dummy variable indicating whether the firm's equity ratio is below a 10% threshold is positive and significant in all regressions. The same holds true for a dummy variable indicating whether the firm uses more than 50% of its line of credit on an annual average basis. As an alternative to the latter we also used a dummy variable that was assigned a value of 1 whenever the firm never or rarely took advantage of early payment discounts offered by its suppliers and zero otherwise. This variable yielded qualitatively identical results. In the brief literature survey above it was already mentioned that in theory as well as in empirical studies of bank-borrower relationships the notion of learning-by-lending plays a prominent role in the modelling of bank information acquisition. The duration of the bank-borrower relationship is therefore often used as a metric for informational intensity in relationship lending. Taking account of the duration of the relationship therefore seems to be extremely important. Specifications reported in table 3 used a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a relationship with the bank for more than 10 years. Estimated coefficients have the expected sign but are not statistically significant. As the questionnaire allowed us to partition the sample into 5 groups according to the duration measure 30 we also used groups of dummy variables in alternative specifications. Joint tests could reject the null in these cases and, perhaps even more importantly, the signs were always as expected. Overall we come to the conclusion that the information that a lending bank naturally accumulates over time has an impact on information acquisition activity. However this paper argues that the duration of bank-borrower relationships is not a sufficient metric to capture banks' incentives to gather borrower-specific information. The important question raised in this paper is whether bank market structure -proxying for bank market power -is a determinant of banks' information acquisition activity. We therefore included a measure of local bank market concentration in our regression equations. As market share information for bank loans and deposits is generally not available in Germany, we constructed concentration measures based on branching information. Denote by MS i,j bank i's market share in local market j. We approximated MS i,j by the number of branches that bank i operates in j divided by the total number of bank branches operated in market j. A local market on the other hand is identical to a specific administrative regional unit. From this market share data we constructed a Herfindahl index by squaring individual banks' market shares and totalling them up. Several alternative concentration measures were also computed and used in the regressions (see 3.6
below). Table 3 shows that local bank market concentration has a statistically significant impact on information transmission activity. 31 Results with respect to bank market structure are extremely robust and statistically significant at conventional levels. They lead us to the central empirical finding of this paper, that of a positive market concentration/information acquisition relationship in bank loan markets.
To further investigate this relationship, we conduct something like a natural experiment. The point here is to explore whether having collected more information in the past enables banks to provide their customers with liquidity at short notice. It is here that those 58 firms that re-negotiated their lines of credit come into play. 32 We therefore reestimated the specifications of Tables 4 and 5 present estimation results for parsimonious specifications. Therefore considering extensions and checking the robustness of our results seems to be a natural and important exercise. We performed these extensions for both our first-step regression (excluding renegotiated lines of credit and interaction terms) as well as for our second-step regressions (including renegotiated lines of credit and interaction terms). Here we briefly report on the results obtained:
Eastern German localisation
Given the descriptive statistics in table 2 it seems natural to control for firms headquartered in the eastern part of Germany as information transmission seemed to be more intensive there.
We did so by introducing a dummy variable into our regression equations. In not a single case could we reject the null of the estimated coefficient being equal to zero. Estimated coefficients were highly insignificant so that appropriately accounting for a firm's financial position seemed to leave no room for a separate eastern Germany effect. Furthermore, none of the qualitative results reported in tables 4 and 5 were affected.
Industry classification
We controlled for industry by using a five-group industry classification. We also used more differentiated industry classifications but that had no effect on the results reported. However, controlling for industry seemed to be important, as indicated by Likelihood Ratio tests.
Local credit risk
Local banking markets might differ with respect to measures of aggregate credit risk that could not be accounted for by industry classification or the firm's financial position. One could think here of a purely local risk measure that is able to capture systematic risk factors that are relevant only locally. Consider, for example, the possibility that a default by a large firm might spill over to local suppliers, which might be affected as unsecured creditors of that firm. We follow Berlin/Mester (1999) in using the local market's rate of unemployment and alternatively its one-year lag as a proxy for local credit risk. In no case did the estimated coefficients show up to be statistically significant nor did any of our results change after considering local unemployment.
Regional classification
Surprisingly, whether local markets were classified as rural, suburban or urban has no effect on our measures of market concentration. Mean and median values for Herfindahl or CR3 are nearly identical if one groups markets according to a regional classification. Nevertheless, we controlled for regional effects by introducing dummy variables for rural and suburban areas (taking urban areas as our base group). We find information acquisition to be more intense in rural areas; estimated coefficients are marginally significant in most specifications. More limited diversification possibilities in more rural areas could be one explanation for this result.
From this perspective, information acquisition and portfolio diversification might appear to be alternative mechanisms to control portfolio credit risk. Note here that local banking markets are dominated by banks that do business only in the specific region where they are headquartered. 33 Because this aspect raises more serious problems for our study we will refer to it in section 3.7 below.
Firm age, limited liability, industrial group
We also controlled for firm age (using firm age in years as well as the logarithm of firm age in years) and whether the firm is a corporation acting under limited liability. For the age variable we censored the observations by restricting the variable to a maximum of 30 years. This was done in order not to bias our results because of some outliers in the sample. Furthermore we introduced a dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to an industrial group. The liability and group variables might proxy for important aspects of bank's perceived credit risk.
None of these firm characteristics entered our regressions significantly. Even more important, considering these variables in our specifications did not alter any of the results reported so far.
Stated purpose
For obvious reasons, it seems to be extremely important not only to control for the firm's current financial position, industry and size but also for the incremental investment to be financed by the loan in question. We have good information on the stated purpose of the financing. This leads us to introduce a vector of dummy variables indicating whether the loan will be used for, say, R&D activity, acquisitions, replacement investment, and the like. 
Collateralisation
We have information on whether the bank required collateral to be posted for the loan in question. Controlling for collateralisation requirements as a binary variable or the type of collateral to be posted does not have any significant effect on our results. However, our method of controlling for collateral is incomplete here as we do not have information on the total degree of collateralisation for all loans taken by the firm, which seems to be much more important in our case.
Number of bank relationships
Given the overall perspective of the analysis it is quite interesting to control for the number of bank relationships a firm has. On the one hand this is often used a proxy for the intensity of the bank-borrower relationship -the more exclusive the relationship, the more intense the relationship is expected to be -on the other hand it could also proxy for inside competition as opposed to outside competition measured by market concentration. Although the number of bank relationships never turns out to be statistically significant in our regression, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a one-bank firm (the firm has only one bank relationship) is robustly negative and highly significant. One should be cautious when interpreting this finding, because only a few firms (around 5% of all observations) have only one bank relationship. However a likely interpretation, reminiscent of the "lazy banks" notion in Manove et al. (1999) , is that inside competition might promote information acquisition whereas outside bank market competition does the opposite.
Alternative measures of bank concentration
As alternatives to the Herfindahl we also considered CR3, the number of banks active in the market, the ratio of the total number of branches to geographic market size (measured in square kilometres), and the midpoint between a theoretical upper bound and lower bound for the Herfindahl given the number of banks in the market. 34 The qualitative results were unaffected by these variations, although significance levels varied slightly but results were always significant at conventional levels.
G.
Caveats: selectivity, endogenous market structure and diversification effects Several important points deserve mention here. The first has to do with our empirical methodology: One might argue that results obtained for the chosen group of firms are seriously biased by an obvious selection problem, namely that the flow of information from firms to banks, which forms the dependent variable in our regression, is only observed for those firms that applied for a loan in the first place. We will elaborate on this problem shortly.
As the kind of analysis we have in mind simply asks for the probability that the dependent variable falls into some category of interest, conditional on a vector of covariates, we can only learn about that probability under the additional condition that a certain event -a loan application -has taken place. 35 Taking that statement seriously means that we could learn nothing about the probability of interest for those firms that did not apply unless we strongly assume that the selection that characterises our sample is purely exogenous. As a further consequence, we could learn nothing about the probability of interest for the whole sample of firms -unconditional on the event having taken place or not. There are standard methods at hand that try to account for selectivity by posing strong assumptions about the joint distribution of the error terms of a selection equation to be estimated and the equation of interest. We will not report the results obtained with these methods here, although there is a strong indication that our main qualitative results are indeed unaffected by taking account of a selection process shaping our data. In particular, we strongly believe that loan application situations are special in that an intensive exchange of information takes place. By this we mean that even if one restricted one's interpretation of our results solely to the group of firms that actually apply for a loan, one could still learn something about the determinants of banks' information acquisition activity.
In interpreting the results two other problems arise which we would like to discuss briefly. Firstly, as already mentioned above, information acquisition might be seen as an alternative to portfolio diversification as a means of controlling portfolio credit risk. The information acquisition/market structure relationship that we measure might thus be shaped by reverse causality in that markets with lower diversification opportunities show higher concentration. It is important to note here that an overwhelming majority of German banks are only doing business in a limited regional market, often identical to the market areas that we use in this study to identify local banking markets. This is not only true for all public sector savings banks but also for mutual banks and a considerable number of private bankers and socalled regional banks. We tried to control for portfolio effects by inserting a proxy measure for diversification in our regression equation, very much like a concentration index. This measure was based on sectoral shares of value added in that specific region. However only rough sectoral information was available (agriculture, services, manufacturing, trade and transport). In all our regressions this measure turned out to be highly insignificant. As an alternative we constructed a probably more sensible measure of the diversification potential within local banking market. This measure is based on the number of employees in a specific industry in that particular local banking market. Using a classification scheme with eighteen industries we measured the concentration of employment across industries which might be proportional to loan demand across industries. Again this measure did not enter our regressions in a significant way.
A second interpretation of our results that suggests reverse causality is that information acquisition and building of strong informational ties with one's customers is a means to prevent entry. In a recent contribution, Dell'Ariccia et al. (1999) argue that informational advantages of incumbent banks might be a deterrent to entry into banking markets. One could think of a scenario where these informational advantages of incumbents are not exogenous but endogenously determined to form barriers to entry into local markets.
The low rate of direct penetration of banking markets in Europe -even after implementation of the single market programme and the common currency -is often interpreted as evidence of informational entry barriers. The design of our study, however, is incapable of uncovering this type of relationship.
H. Credit availability and early payment discounts
In the last step of our empirical study, we ask whether firms located in more concentrated banking markets are less liquidity-constrained for the reasons discussed above. If in more concentrated markets banks know systematically more about their clients, there is reason to believe that they could provide liquidity more easily because incentive problems are better controlled for. Here we follow Petersen/Rajan (1995) in using information on the share of early payment discounts taken by the firm as an indicator of credit availability. Within the questionnaire, firms were asked how often they paid early, thereby taking advantage of discounts offered by their suppliers. The questionnaire offered 4 categories (never/rarely/frequently/always) which we take as an ordered category. 36 Table 5 shows the estimation results. Our primary interest here again is in the effect that local banking market concentration has on the frequency of using early payment discounts offered by suppliers. The coefficient for the Herfindahl is positive and highly significant in all regressions. Given that firms' early payment behaviour is a good indicator of credit availability, these results indicate that credit is more readily available in more concentrated banking markets. This result is in line with Petersen and Rajan's (1995) findings for the local US banking markets. However the results of the first two steps of our analysis offer a somewhat more focused explanation for this observation: Petersen and Rajan's argument points to intertemporal patterns in loan contracting as a determinant of credit availability. This paper points to another mechanism that might be important in that it emphasises systematic differences in banks' accumulation of borrower-specific information.
Generally, market structure variables seem to be of great importance as shown also by estimated coefficients for the eastern German dummy, the rate of unemployment and at least one of the regional dummies. Again the Herfindahl is of primary interest in these regressions.
All other coefficients have the expected sign. Coefficients for firm profitability and equity ratio as well as sales (again as a size proxy) seem to be significant determinants of credit availability. We also estimated the specification in table 5 for the western German and eastern
German subsample separately and obtained qualitatively identical results. In both regressions coefficients for the Herfindahl were positive and significant. The overall conclusion from this last step of the analysis could be summarized as follows: Given that the usage of early payment discounts by firms is a useful measure of credit availability, credit seems to be more readily available in more concentrated banking markets. This result is in line with
Petersen/Rajan's findings for small US firms. 37 Unfortunately this study is not able to distinguish between their explanation for the market power/credit availability correlation and the one suggested by differences in information acquisition activity.
[table 5 around here]
III.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that information gathering by banks forms the basis for most of the theory of bank uniqueness. If, however, information acquisition is costly, the competitive structure of the banking industry might be an important determinant of the informational intensity of bank-borrower relationships. More recent theoretical assessments of bank screening/monitoring in loan markets take this into account but offer conflicting hypotheses about the nature of the impact of bank market structure on information gathering.
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to study the market power/information relationship empirically. We are able to measure information flows from loan applicants to banks within a loan application situation for a sample of small and mediumsized German firms. In our study we then try to explain these information flows within a regression framework. As could be expected, riskier firms and firms that are in a poor financial position have to disclose more information to their potential lenders when applying for a loan.
Local banking market structure as approximated by standard measures of market concentration seems to have a considerable influence on banks' information gathering even if one controls for loan characteristics as well as for standard relationship variables and market variables different from concentration. We then ask whether there are situations where crosssectional differences in the equilibrium amount of information accumulated in the past might be of importance in the sense that the transmission of incremental borrower-specific information might be a substitute for less information acquired in the past. We find banks'
provision of liquidity to their loan customers at short notice to be such a situation. Expressed the other way around: if a bank has systematically acquired more information in the past, less additional information is needed to provide liquidity to a borrower that has experienced a shortage of liquidity. Given the importance that banks' liquidity provision to borrowing firms has attracted in recent theories of bank uniqueness, we find this to be a very important aspect of bank behaviour.
Finally we ask whether, due to superior information acquisition by their lenders, credit is more readily available to firms in more concentrated markets. Using the share of early payment discounts taken by the firm as a proxy for credit availability, we find a significantly positive correlation between bank market concentration and credit availability. This last step is a reappraisal of Petersen/Rajan's (1995) study and confirms their findings for US firms.
The first part of our paper, however, offers a somewhat more specific explanation of why this relationship seems to hold.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis of a market power/information acquisition relationship in bank loan markets and a lot more has to be done in this area to fully understand the implications of recent shifts in the competitive structure of financial markets. Our results indicate, however, that increasing competitive pressure within banking markets has a negative impact on banks' information acquisition and as a consequence might hamper their function of providing liquidity to borrowers who have experienced a liquidity shock. Taking account of these interrelationships between acquisition of private information on the one hand and the ability to provide liquidity at short notice on the other might prove to be extremely important in assessing the welfare implications of financial intermediary market power. transaction account with an overdraft facility and that for practical purposes it does not have a contractually agreed upon maturity. 33 This aspect of German banking is often overlooked. 34 The lower bound is 1/N, where N is the number of banks in the market; for computing the upper bound we assumed a dominant firm and N-1 fringe firms with 1% market shares respectively. 35 The author wants to thank Claudia Plötscher for making him aware of problems caused by sample selection. See Manski (1995) for an excellent exposition of selectivity problems. 36 We do not intend to provide a broader discussion on the appropriateness of DISCOUNT as an indicator of credit availability here. However one should take the possibility into account that trade credit of this type becomes cheaper the longer the firm waits to pay the supplier. This is not controlled for in our analysis but might be seen as a major drawback of that indicator of credit availability. 37 Complementary evidence is provided by Zarutskie (2003).
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